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THE DYNAMICS OF MANAGERIAL IDEOLOGY:  
ANALYZING THE CUBAN CASE  
 
ABSTRACT 
After the collapse of state socialism in Eastern Europe, management researchers 
devoted considerable energy to investigate ways to smooth transition to market 
economies. But one country of the former Soviet bloc, Cuba resisted transition and 
reaffirmed loyalty to communism. Little is known about management in Cuba on the 
managerial impacts of the combination of two major environmental forces: the 
American embargo and the Soviet Union collapse, both of which have challenged the 
sustainability of the communist regime. This study intends to approach one particular 
aspect of management in Cuba: the relationship between national ideology and 
management practice. To analyze these topics, direct qualitative data from focus groups 
with Cuban managers and management professors was obtained and complemented 
with documentary analysis. Results suggest that the dynamics of managerial ideology 
can be understood as the interplay of several processes operating at distinct levels: 
institutional, professional, organizational and individual. The study provides a nested, 
multi-level understanding of management and organization as parts of a wider 
institutional context, which is both a source of constraint and a non-tangible resource to 
be used by ideological bricoleurs. The interplay between the acceptance of ideology and 
its use as a practical resource is a potential source of change. As such, the same 
professional class (managers) may be both a source of continuity and a trigger of change 
- a finding that is line with institutional theory’s claim that it is necessary to understand 
both institutionalization and de-institutionalization for understanding organizational 
change and continuity. 
Key words: Cuba, managerial ideology, institutional change, ideological bricolage. 
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The practice of management and the functioning of organizations is deeply embedded in 
the national context where it takes place. Clark and Mueller (1996, p.126) argued that 
“firms are so embedded, constrained and encultured by their national homes that the 
room for corporate agency and its zones of manoeuvre could be, and perhaps is, rather 
small.” This article discusses organizational embededdness in the Cuban case. Through 
a qualitative approach, linkages at the institutional, professional, organizational and 
individual levels are analyzed, regarding managerial ideology and practice.  
 
Our interest for the theme was stimulated by the centrality attached by Cuban managers 
to the role of values and values-based management, spiritual incentives, references to 
the Communist Party as an ideological beacon and other explicitly ideological themes in 
the conversations. The importance of values was so stressed by informants that we 
decided to analyze this specific aspect of the Cuban managerial context. This may be a 
worthy research effort considering that, as noted by Rodrigues and Child (2003a), there 
is limited understanding of the process of importation and utilization of ideology by 
organizations.  
 
It is well known that organizations are infused with ideology (e.g., Simons and Ingram, 
1997) but less is known about the dynamics of ideology, namely about the relationship 
between the individual, organizational, professional and institutional levels of analysis. 
Additionally, studies devoted to the dynamics of ideology usually have access to cases 
where a change in ideology (e.g., following a privatization) implies the concomitant 
adoption of new practice (e.g. Cunha & Cooper, 2002).  
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In this case, we are, on the contrary, studying how the same ideology was meant to 
paradoxically stimulate and resist change in managerial practice in a context of 
environmental change. Due to its particularities in a world of ideological homogeneity 
(Strang and Meyer, 1993), the case of Cuba appears as a relevant site to dissect the 
dynamics of ideology.  
 
With the previous goals in mind, we start our discussion with an overview of the Cuban 
socioeconomic condition. The following sections describe the methods and results. 
Direct qualitative data from focus groups with Cuban managers and management 
professors were complemented by documentary analysis. Results suggest that the 
dynamics of managerial ideology can be understood with recourse to several 
interrelated dialectical processes operating at multiple levels. The study provides a 
multi-level integrated approach to the dynamics of ideology, and adopts a dialectical 
interpretation of change. The opposition between national ideology and the surrounding 
market forces, is leading to a management innovation process with dialectical features, 
with new knowledge being dynamically created out of contradictions (e.g., Nonaka and 
Toyama, 2002).  
 
The paper contributes to several research areas. Firstly, to research dealing with the 
paradoxes involved in the creation of new management knowledge. Paradoxes and 
contradictions have been presented as sources of change; the paper will offer empirical 
material on this (Van de Ven & Poole, 1995). Secondly, it contributes to the 
understanding of the relationships between managerial action and ideology. By 
integrating several layers of analysis, it facilitates the understanding of the dynamics of 
managerial ideology in a context where the need to change management practice meets 
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the requirement to keep ideological values untouched. Thirdly, the paper contributes to 
the analysis of managerial intentionality under high levels of institutional pressure, an 
aspect that is relevant both to strategic choice as well as to institutional theories. To 
familiarize the reader with the singularities of the case, we start with an overview of the 
socioeconomic context of managerial action in Cuba.             
 
CUBA: THE SOCIOECONOMIC CONTEXT 
Management philosophy in Cuba has been heavily influenced by the Soviet 
management paradigm. The Soviet paradigm enunciated that there is a clear distinction 
between the nature and problems of socialist and capitalist administration, with the 
principles of the latter not being applicable in the former – Miller (1971) developed an 
analysis of  the history of management in the USSR and helped to understand how these 
differences have been enacted over the course of the communist regime’s existence. 
There are many reasons why the nature and problems of administration in Cuba are 
different from those in capitalist countries and, of course, different from the problems 
faced by today’s Russia or China, countries that eventually diverged from the socialist 
model. In order to facilitate the understanding of management in contemporary Cuba, a 
brief overview of management in the country during and after the communist revolution 
will be provided in the following sections.  
 
Before the fall of the Soviet bloc. The communist revolution of 1959 established the 
end of capitalist Cuba and the development of a close relationship with the Eastern bloc. 
Management practices were learned from the Soviet model and relied on central 
planning: plants producing the same items were integrated; their trade activity was 
regulated by a ministry; JUCEPLAN produced a national plan for the ministries, then to 
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empresas; production meetings were held and workers presented their suggestions for 
possible modifications; the plan then retraces its steps upwards to JUCEPLAN; plans 
were approved by the ministries; they finally were sent back down in the form of goals 
for each plant. Having adopted the Soviet model, Cuba employed the same principles of 
centralized macro-management that, similarly to the Soviet Union, transformed the 
economy into something like a “nation-sized organization” with thousands of 
subsidiaries and divisions (Lawrence et al., 1990). This large “nation-sized 
organization” was governed according to COMECON’s doctrine that whatever a 
country was not able to produce could be imported from sister nations at preferential 
rates. Using the description of Groves et al (1994), enterprises in Cuba may be thought 
of as “branch plants of a single giant firm”. In this “giant organization” laws regulated 
the basic functions of management, from resource allocation to reward systems, to the 
recruitment and promotion of employees. Strong regulatory mechanisms that 
disseminate and monitor compliance with institutional norms have been shown to be 
especially strong in governmental sectors (Hoskisson et al., 2000), leading to uniformity 
in managerial practice and nurturing egalitarianism as a crucial trait of the communist 
society (Giacobbe-Miller et al., 2003).                        
 
After the fall of the Soviet bloc. The difficulties resulting from the combination of the 
American embargo, tightened after the Helms-Burton law of 1996 (Cuban Liberty 
Democratic Solidarity Act), and the fall of the Soviet bloc, forced the regime to adopt a 
plan of economic emergency, which was labeled periodo especial or “special period in 
peacetime”. The enormous challenges confronted during the periodo especial have been 
described by Lara (1999b, p.232) as follows: “Behind these four words [special period 
in peacetime] lies the greatest crisis that the Revolution has had to confront in its 
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history”. The fall of the Soviet Union hit the Cuban economy due to the two-way trade 
between the country and other communist regimes – for the three decades before 1989, 
85% of Cuban commerce was with COMECON nations (Kaplowitz, 1995), with the 
economy being kept safely isolated from the logic of the market. Between 1989 and 
1993, GNP was reduced by almost 50%. The special period was thus a time of material 
difficulties and forced change.  
 
The Soviet-style management thinking, learned and applied for decades, was no longer 
a valid approach to gain access to the resources necessary for reinvigorating a 
debilitated economy. Thus, over the space of a decade, significant changes took place 
not only at the economic level but also and inevitably, at the managerial one. Economic 
change, leveraged by the need to acquire resources in the global market, is illustrated by 
the rapid growth of the tourism industry, which became a prominent economic sector. 
Between 1986 and 1994, the number of rooms increased 480%, from 5,000 to more than 
24,000. To accommodate this important transformation, changes in the managerial 
mindset became necessary. The dysfunctional consequences of central planning, 
labyrinthic bureaucracy and technological obsolescence characterizing most Cuban 
organizations, became evident when new organizational effectiveness criteria were 
introduced.  
 
Despite increases in the level of managerial autonomy (Cunha and Cunha, 2003), the 
communist ideology prevailing in Cuba still refuses the liberal ideology, founded on 
private ownership, the free market and individualism. In fact, the country adopts the 
opposite forces as the right ones: state ownership, a tightly controlled market, and 
collectivism, with companies being instruments of the government rather than 
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independent entities. In sum, despite recent changes, the government still tightly 
commands the economy.  
 
Considering the specifics of the Cuban case, it provides an adequate context for the 
analysis of the co-evolutionary dynamics of organizations and the institutional regimes 
in which they are embedded. As noted by Rodrigues and Child (2003b), most studies on 
this theme focus on a free market environment where a high degree of strategic choice 
is expected to exist (Child, 1997). In contrast, studies are scarce on contexts 
characterized by high levels of direct institutional regulation. This study, then, 
contributes to an analysis of the proposition that “even when the environment is highly 
institutionalized, a degree of strategic choice may be possible” (Rodrigues and Child, 
2003b, p.2159). Hence, the study sheds light on how managers may exert strategic 
choice in a highly regulated context. With the above in mind, we move to the empirical 
study.  
 
METHOD 
The research reported here is based on information collected from multiple sources 
through several data collection techniques, including analysis of bibliography on Cuban 
sociology, economy and management (e.g., Dieste, 1997; Lara, 1999a; Castanedo, 
2002), informal conversations and personal observations. All these approaches serve to 
develop a grounded understanding of the context and to complement a central and more 
structured data collection technique: a series of focus groups with Cuban executives and 
management academics. The use of qualitative methods to study institutional processes 
has been encouraged by Dacin, Godstein and Scott (2002) as a means to uncover 
aspects that may go unnoticed in quantitative studies focussed on the macro level.  
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We visited Cuba seven times between 1995 and 2004, with formal data collection 
taking place at three different moments in the years 2000, 2002 and 2003. Our 
interpretation was constructed around thematic phenomena in accordance with 
interpretative research methods (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). The research is of the 
descriptive, inductive type, aiming at pattern recognition (Mintzberg, 1979). The themes 
discussed here emerged throughout the focus groups and via the application of a 
unanimity rule: only themes considered unanimously relevant for characterizing 
management in Cuba were retained for consideration (Chilton and Hutchinson, 1999). 
For analytical purposes, these themes will be treated independently. In practice, 
however, they are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. The persistent mention of 
ideology and the ideological process motivated us to explore this specific aspect of the 
managerial process, namely through the articulation between the institutional, 
professional, organizational and individual levels of analysis. When appropriate, we will 
use quotes in order to facilitate access to raw data and to improve richness of meaning 
(Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2000).      
 
Our sample was composed of 107 general managers, 72 technical/professional staff 
working for state-owned enterprises affiliated with most ministries and located 
throughout Cuba, and 32 management professors. The total number of informants was 
211. These informants participated in twenty focus groups. The discussions taking place 
in the focus groups were conducted in a semi-structured fashion. The focus group can 
be described as “a research technique that collects data through group interaction on a 
topic determined by the researcher” (Morgan, 1996, p.130). The focus group technique 
is derived from Merton’s focus group interview (Merton and Kendall, 1946), and aims 
 10
to generate information that would potentially be lost through the use of more structured 
approaches. It seems suitable, therefore, for articulating tacit knowledge and generating 
deep level data.  
 
The focus group seemed adequate for this particular study because, given the changes 
underway in the Cuban society (Dieste, 1997; Cunha and Cunha, 2003), it could be 
difficult for outsiders to develop a highly structured data collection approach to the 
Cuban case. Additionally, the collective discussion stimulated in a focus group may 
help individuals in their sensemaking efforts. In accordance with the previous 
arguments, Morgan (1996) argued that the discussion in a focus group represents more 
than the sum of separate individual interviews in the sense that the discussion elicits 
new thinking about a given phenomenon, extending the individual repertoires of 
knowledge. These collective interpretations have been described as leading to the 
creation of a group mind (Chilton and Hutchinson, 1999), a concept that denotes the 
potential for knowledge creation through interaction: as put by Weick (2002), 
“knowledge is not something people possess in their heads but rather something people 
do together.” (p.S8) 
  
The focus groups were conducted in Spanish, according to an open discussion script 
consisting of an analysis of the major changes taking place in Cuba. The number of 
subjects in each focus group ranged from 8 to 15, a number that is higher than the 6 to 8 
subjects normally recommended (Asbury, 1995). Time constraints impeded further 
divisions of respondents into smaller focus groups. Each focus group meeting lasted 
approximately one hour and thirty minutes. Notes were taken during the discussions. To 
facilitate open discussion, focus groups were not recorded. Once participants gave their 
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opinions on a given issue, the moderator summarized by asking the group’s consensus 
on the importance of the specific issue. Lack of consensus led to the exclusion of the 
topic from further analysis. Notes were organized into a codebook that systematized the 
topics discussed and the participants’ perspectives on these topics. Data collection took 
place after the regular sessions of a management development programme organized 
and taught by faculty members of five European universities.  
 
RESULTS 
Results suggest that managerial practice in Cuba is tightly articulated with a system of 
social and institutional sanctions intended to reinforce the role of the firm and that of the 
manager in a socialist country. Social sanctioning, combined with institutional 
sanctioning, are the enforcing mechanisms of political and managerial ideologies. 
Hagen and Choe’s (1998) research on the functioning of networks in the Japanese 
automobile industry found an equivalent combination of social and institutional 
mechanisms for regulating macro-level organizational behavior. Our study allows, 
however, the analysis of how the social and institutional levels intertwine and reinforce 
one another. Below, we discuss the institutional dynamics of the ideological process. 
We complemented the themes extracted from the focus groups with bibliographical 
sources in order to gain a deeper understanding of the case. Four levels are considered: 
institutional, professional, organizational and individual.  
                         
The resulting interpretation is summarized in Table 1. This interpretive framework is 
based upon a dialectical approach, with this theoretical framework being adopted due to 
the frequent references to contradictory requirements noted during data collection and 
analysis (e.g., the need to preserve the values of the revolution while improving 
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managerial practice, the need to attract resources in the international market without 
embracing the logic of capitalism; the urge to give managers more autonomy and 
accountability without losing the collectivist ethos of the society as a whole) as well as a 
consequence of previous use of dialectics to explain the Cuban managerial process; see 
Cunha and Cunha, 2003 and Cunha and Cunha, 2004). The relevance of dialectics as a 
theoretical lens for understanding the institutional process has been noted in the 
literature. Zilber (2002), for example, associated institutional change with the 
“dialectical interplay between (...) actions (practices and structures), meanings and 
actors” (p.235, italics in the original). With this study we contribute to the 
understanding of the dialectics of institutional change through the articulation of the 
micro and macro processes leading to institutionalization and de-institutionalization.                        
 
Table 1 about here 
   
The institutional level. In March 1968, the so-called “revolutionary offensive” closed 
50,000 small businesses in Cuba, the justification attributed to the immorality of private 
business and material incentives. The revolutionary society (thesis) was being created. 
The institutions of capitalism (antithesis) were said to mar the character of the “new 
man” expected to arise from the revolution. In May 1967 President Fidel Castro pointed 
out in a speech to the Association of Small Farmers that “we shall do away with the vile 
intermediary, money” (in Thomas, 2001, p.987). Work heroes in the Soviet style – 
people willing to sacrifice their self-interest for the sake of common good – were 
introduced to be emulated, their accomplishments being extraordinary: it is said that in 
1963, Reinaldo Castro cut a daily average of 1,280 arrobas of cane, compared with the 
modest 150 arrobas of the average cane cutter. Socialist emulation, a reward system in 
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use between 1962 and 1967 was abolished, apparently due to the troubling choices of 
first prize winners: material goods, such as bicycles or refrigerators, were often 
preferred to a more “spiritually attractive” holiday in Russia.  
 
The previous notions express the ideological nature of work in the Cuban organization. 
The organization, in fact, is part of the socialist system, deeply embedded in it, not 
independent and autonomous. Cuban organizations were managed in the Soviet style, 
through a translation of the GOSPLAN to a local JUCEPLAN. Companies’ goals were 
centrally established according to national needs. Managers and union leaders were 
appointed by the government from the stock of “vanguard workers” or “exemplary 
workers”. Their role is as much a professional as a political one. Company walls are 
covered with posters, adjuring patriotism and highlighting the expected behaviors of the 
revolutionary worker. The work context is thus an ideologically saturated one. Ideology, 
operating as a “technology of the self” (Rodrigues and Child, 2003a, p.11), influences 
not only the managerial function but also individual identity: influence inculcates values 
and values “are an important source of discipline when we frame problems.” (Weick, 
2002, p.S8) In this sense, values are self-disciplining premises that mold identity and 
help to identify, frame and understand issues.       
 
The institutional environment in Cuba is therefore marked by an overt hostility to the 
institutions of capitalism, namely money, private property and individually-
differentiated earnings. As one informant reported, “management should strive for 
equality, not equity.” Spiritual development and moral incentives are hence presented as 
the most valuable rewards one can achieve. Quotations like “spiritual motivations are 
extremely important, especially in a context of material scarcity” or “spiritual 
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satisfaction is a major work outcome” illustrate the centrality of the spiritual component 
at work.  They were often qualified by participants as the most honorable prizes. The 
lack of reference to these elements during the discussion of a case study of a Western 
company was noted with surprise: “The case misses moral indicators. It just includes 
sales, and other material indicators.”     
 
The education system plays an active role in the sustenance and support of such a highly 
marked ideological environment. As observed by López (2002), “higher education in 
Cuba is oriented towards the development of socialist conscience and to the diffusion, 
with intellectual passion, of the ever more clear intelligence acquired by the masses of 
Cuban workers.” Active belonging to society is hence presented as an honorable end: 
“Belonging and being part of society are strong motivators”, one of our informants 
pointed out. 
  
 
The previous notions and practices developed over decades and became institutionalized 
in an encapsulated environment, but the notion of the free market knocked on Cuba’s 
door following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc. After a period of 
transactions of goods under the regime of special partnerships between communist 
nations, Cuban companies found themselves competing for resources in the exposed 
global market, which meant that they have had to start worrying about international 
competitiveness (Martin de Holan and Philips, 1997). The introduction of agility and 
efficiency was perceived as a necessary means toward improving organizational 
competitiveness. A centrally controlled plan was established, aiming to improve 
organizational competence and controlled competition (synthesis), without resorting to 
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excessive managerial autonomy and genuinely open and competitive markets. This 
programme received the name of perfeccionamiento empresarial, or enterprise 
perfecting. It started in 1987 under the aegis of the Ministry of the Armed Forces and 
has been described as “the first initiative in terms of direction and organization of the 
enterprise” (Dieste, 1997, p.46). We shall return to enterprise perfecting below.       
                  
The professional level. Loyalty to the regime’s official views is not optional. This is 
evident, for example, in the way people are selected and promoted, which puts some 
emphasis on political criteria. Managers are viewed as custodians of the revolution 
(thesis). They are encouraged to see themselves as members of the sociedad obrera, the 
working class. They are expected to coordinate the organization’s revolutionary 
organisms and to exert participation and democratic centralism (Dieste, 1997). They are 
therefore protectors of the common good and are expected to respond to the society. 
The people is both shareholder and the major stakeholder. According to one manager: 
“The goal of Cuban enterprise is the satisfaction of the needs of the customers and of 
the working population.” Managerial work is heavily constrained by the institutional 
environment, a fact which limits managerial options and encourages inertia (Oliver, 
1992). This approach is indeed in sharp contrast with the Western conception 
(antithesis) of managers as self-motivated actors that exercise formally independent and 
strategically intentional choices (Child, 1997; Tsoukas and Shepherd, 2004) in favor of 
the owners, being paid to create shareholder value. After the collapse of the communist 
bloc, the traditional view of the manager as custodian of the revolution was 
complemented with a new meaning: a guardian of the revolution in this new context 
needed to show both ideological fervor and managerial competence. To defend the 
revolution, managers were expected to create the resources necessary to alleviate 
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people’s daily difficulties. A new model-manager emerged through the synthesis of the 
old thesis and the undesired antithesis: the socialist manager (synthesis). These new 
managers are still socialist and political guardians of the revolutionary values, but now 
also professionals with a growing orientation to results.                      
 
Managers are usually thought of as enjoying a degree of personal autonomy higher than 
they may actually have (Hannan and Freeman, 1989). They are expected to make 
decisions and to be evaluated on the basis of the consequences of those decisions. In the 
case of Cuba, managers, however, are part of a collective process, which is tightly 
bounded by state initiatives. They are agents of the state, and vehicles of ideological 
implementation. The management selection process ensures that positions of 
hierarchical responsibility are filled with people willing and able to defend 
revolutionary values and ideals. Promotion to managerial positions depends not only on 
professional competence but also on political qualities, namely idoneidad: “Idoneidad is 
the fundamental characteristic of the socialist worker”, as one participant remarked. 
Those qualities will be evaluated both by the institutional political means and by the 
Committees for the Defense of the Revolution. These committees exist on “every 
street”, according to Thomas (2001, p.996) and everyone can join them. They conduct 
such activities as vigilance and implementing educational, medical or any other type of 
campaign. Additionally they hold regular seminars on revolutionary instruction. They 
also report on suspicious counter-revolutionary activities. To become a manager, one 
needs to be considered as having the adequate qualities according to the committee to 
which he or she belongs. Managerial selection is hence decided on several grounds with 
the ideological pressures to comply being significant. Those who do not adequately fit 
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the revolutionary standards are not allowed to enter positions of organizational 
responsibility.                       
 
Due to the fall of the Soviet bloc, managerial expertise became more important than it 
used to be: the need to attract and to efficiently manage resources became a fundamental 
challenge to the society as a whole and to this professional group in particular. As such, 
managers are not passive receivers of ideological contents, but rather active agents of 
the ideological process. Evidence suggests that they may be using ideology to legitimize 
the introduction of new practices that, to a certain extent, may be viewed with suspicion 
within the current framework (Martin de Holan and Phillips, 2002). These innovative 
uses of ideology raise, of course, problems of legitimacy, which means that managerial 
learning in Cuba is contested terrain, in the sense that it must prove not only its 
effectiveness but also its legitimacy. This is in line with Townley’s (2002) observation 
that institutional change is a contested process, particularly when the sources of change 
are political in nature. Considering the impact of professional associations in 
institutional change (Greenwood, Suddaby and Hinings, 2002), it is possible to propose 
that managers may act as agents of incremental change through modifications in 
practice (e.g., the introduction of differentiating reward systems). This possibility is 
further discussed below.      
 
The organizational level. Organizations are “managed”, to a certain degree, by their 
environments (Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). This external 
influence is more evident in Cuba’s organizational landscape than in other contexts. 
Orchestration of the organizational functioning occurs in two major fields: the definition 
of organizational plans and goals, and the limits imposed by ideology on the 
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organization’s role. Organizations in Cuba are socialist in the sense that they are part of 
a societal socialist project (thesis). This is in sharp contrast with the conception of the 
firm in capitalistic settings (antithesis). Socialist firms are notoriously linked to a 
collective mission determined by the state, envisioning the common good. Capitalist 
firms pursue private interests and work as quasi-independent entities. The visible and 
invisible hands of managers and the market are less important in Cuba than the 
powerful hand of the state. The state has recently, in selected cases, decided to allow 
more discretion to the managerial hand. Theses cases are those entering the process of 
enterprise perfecting, mentioned above. Perfected organizations are expected to effect a 
synthesis between the missionary virtues of the communist organization and the 
professional management of competitive firms. According to institutional theory, the 
visibility of these cases as exemplars of modern management may further a process of 
de-institutionalization of more traditional forms (Lee and Pennings, 2002).                       
 
Regarding the limits imposed by ideology on the organization’s role, it should be re-
emphasized that Cuban organizations exist to fulfil societal needs and not to create 
shareholder wealth. The fundamental stakeholder is “the people”. Companies should 
then be managed in strict adherence to the revolutionary ideals. After the Soviet Union’s 
collapse, political qualities became insufficient to solve the problems of scarcity and 
inefficiency facing most companies. This led to the need to develop managerial talent: 
“[Regarding managerial promotion] In the past political trustworthiness prevailed. 
Today, it is still a fundamental aspect, but now coupled with competence”. New 
techniques were sought, the above mentioned programme of company perfecting was 
instigated under the auspices of the Ministry of the Armed Forces, and the degree of 
managerial discretion of “perfected” companies increased.  
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This process of managerial empowerment was accompanied by a significant interest for 
the topic of dirección por valores, or values-based management. The theory of values-
based management is well known in capitalist societies (e.g. Quinn and Jones, 1995), 
and Cuban authors on the topic draw extensively on western sources (e.g. Covey, 
Blanchard, Schein) but include adaptations that are an answer to local issues. Writing 
about values-based management as an organizational ideology, Llorca (2002) offers a 
set of thirteen questions to be answered by managers. Question number seven reads as 
follows: “Do you know any orientations of the Cuban Communist Party and the 
government in order to have a more successful ‘ideology’?” Political and professional 
expertise are thus two faces of the same reality. As pointed out by President Castro in a 
speech in December 2001, “to prepare oneself is the most sacred duty; to develop 
professional and political knowledge is an indispensible requirement.” (in Rivera, 2002, 
p.102; italics added). This institutional-based value system is the rule in Cuba but not in 
the capitalist countries where value choices are viewed as subjective interpretations of 
ethical principles (Anderson, 1997). What in the capitalist system belongs to the domain 
of the private sphere, in Cuba is the object of public control. 
 
The enterprise perfecting programme aims to achieve: the implementation of 
decentralized functioning, the deepening of market relations across the value chain, and 
a better use of financial indicators. Perfeccionamiento empresarial can be understood as 
a controlled experiment to substitute the traditional forms of administration by practices 
more suitable to a market economy logic. Companies admitted to the programme are 
encouraged to pursue a set of managerial goals that include greater autonomy in 
decisions of staffing and compensation, management by objectives and monetary 
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rewards as sources of motivation, the creation of a culture of continuous improvement, 
and the use of total quality management as a means for organizational betterment. Its 
tight control by the corresponding ministry ensures that excessive liberties will not be 
granted to managers and their companies. It then effects a synthesis between managerial 
accountability and central ideological control. 
 
The individual level. Managers in Cuba were traditionally selected from the breed of 
“vanguard workers”. Vanguard managers were those who best guaranteed the defence 
of the conquests of the revolution. Their ideological merits needed to be unquestionable 
(thesis). This is in contrast with the western view of the competent manager, one who 
needs to be skilful in technical terms (antithesis). Competent managers in the Fayolian 
style are said to be those able to plan, organize, direct and control. Or, in the 
Mintzberguian approach, they are those able to play the interpersonal, informational and 
decisional roles (Mintzberg, 1973). These roles are concerned with the organization. In 
the case of Cuba, an alternative concept of the good manager seems to be developing: 
that of the ideological bricoleur (synthesis).  
 
Ideological bricoleurs use the political context as a resource. Deep knowledge of the 
ideological material and proved loyalty, allows managers-as-ideological-bricoleurs to 
use political ideas in unusual, though legitimate, ways. Deep knowledge of the materials 
is a requisite for bricolating (Weick, 1993); unquestionable loyalty is fundamental for 
infusing change with legitimacy (Dacin et al., 2002). Taking the context as resource 
means that micro-political (Burns, 1961) bricolage is a means for variation. 
Micropoliticking refers to the capacity to use individual prestige and personal 
relationships to alleviate the institutional pressure and influence the acceptance of 
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favourable variations in the managerial process. In this case, managerial variation is 
introduced and legitimized in reference to the political context. We call it ideological 
bricolage because one needs to be quite familiar with the ideological material to use it in 
novel ways without appearing to be counter-revolutionary. Martin de Holan and Philips 
(2002) pointed out how politically respected managers use their prestige as a means for 
gaining an increasing level of autonomy in the administration of their companies, 
through a delicate combination of political orthodoxy and managerial innovation.   
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In their research on the institutional environment of Chinese firms, Boisot and Child 
(1988) noticed that organizational behavior was regulated by appeals to “good conduct” 
(p.512). In this paper we explored the process through which “good conduct” is 
communicated and enforced in practice through a system of institutional and social 
sanctions (Hagen and Choe, 1998) that aims to create something similar to what Adler 
and Adler (1988) called intense loyalty, or the devotional commitment of people to a 
common cause. Intense loyalty involves both a voluntary and enthusiastic adherence to 
a mission, and some degree of subordination and domination.  
 
This study contributes to management knowledge through the analysis of the multiple 
levels involved in the process of intense loyalty creation in Cuba, the last communist 
country in the western world. We concluded, in line with Merkens et al. (2001), that 
managers absorb values with high ideological content and use them as triggers and 
justifications for action. The paper also highlights the role of the political/ideological 
forces in managerial practice, a fact that tends to be obscured in the West, due to the 
relatively recent idea that organizations are independent of the state and not instruments 
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of the government (Micklethwait and Wooldridge, 2003). Taking Cuba as a “political 
machine” (Thomas, 2001, p.993), one views managers as political actors who at once 
reinforce the structure through ideological loyalty, and change it through action 
intended to solve practical, local problems. The paper thus contributes to the 
understanding of organizations as instruments of ideology.  
 
This is easy to notice in the case of Cuba but may not be much different in the West, 
where managers internalize a set of ideological values and use them as part of their 
strategic repertoires. The ideologies of the free market, shareholder value creation, and 
managerial agency are possibly no less potent than the socialist ideology in Cuba. 
Ideological changes may be, however, more difficult to notice in the case of Western 
countries because they are apparently natural, hence unmanaged. The dialectical tension 
between the dominant logic and the new challenges is relatively salient in Cuba as a 
source of change. Similar topics may be less visible in the West because their shaping 
comes from multiple sources.  
 
In parallel with this research, it could be pertinent to study the dynamics of ideology in 
the west, namely the emergence of the dominant theories of the firm. This analysis 
would help to understand the development of different capitalist models as well as the 
growing dominance of the American-based shareholder capitalism model. If the Cuban 
state looks for the creation of managers intensely loyal to the socialist approach, it may 
not be less true that western governments look for intensely loyal managers to the 
capitalist approach. If that is the case, it could be relevant to analyze the multi-level 
configuration of processes used for accomplishing such a purpose.     
 
 23
The study suffers from several limitations. Some of these have to do with the design. 
The approach is qualitative, and alternative interpretations could have been extracted 
(Manning & Cullum-Swan, 1987). This limitation is linked with another: the 
interpretations developed in this paper have been elaborated from a foreign perspective. 
This may have advantages, as an outsider may be more distanced and aware of the 
singularity of management and organizing in Cuba, but it has some disadvantages as 
well, including the necessarily distant knowledge of national culture. It is also possible 
that the interpretations produced here have been marked, to some extent, by what 
Cubans call doble moral – double standards (Lepper, 2003): thinking one thing and 
saying another. Processes like doble moral, social desirability or any other form of 
social conformity exist and we cannot guarantee that, in one way or another, they were 
not operating during the data collection process.      
 
Despite its limitations, the research provided an exploratory understanding of the 
dynamics of managerial ideology in Cuba, a country where ideological factors are more 
explicit than in Western capitalist contexts. It contributed to a nested, multi-level 
understanding of management and organization as parts of a wider institutional context, 
which is both a source of constraint and a non-tangible resource to be used by 
ideological bricoleurs. This dialectical interplay between the acceptance of ideology and 
its use as a practical resource is a potential source of change. As such, paradoxically, the 
same professional class (managers) may act both as a source of continuity and a trigger 
of change, a finding that is in line with institutional theory’s observation that it is 
necessary to understand both institutionalization and de-institutionalization (Scott, 
2001), or the persistence and variation of social institutions (Goodrick and Salancik, 
 24
1996). This study suggests that these may be simultaneous, instead of contrary or 
sequential processes, a finding that should be further explored.  
 
The articulation of multiple levels seems to be necessary for understanding the process 
of institutional change, as pointed out by Dacin et al. (2002). Most of the aspects 
discussed above may, to a certain degree, be common to capitalist societies, and with 
this research we hope to have contributed to the understanding of management as a 
professional process deeply embedded in the wider societal context, namely on the often 
“transparent” but influential ideological context. It thus helps to explore the concept of 
agency as “a temporally embedded process of social engagement” (Emirbayer and 
Mische, 1998, p.963) which is informed by the past (e.g., in this case the revolutionary 
ideals), the present (e.g., the need to solve immediate problems) and the future (e.g., the 
preservation of the “revolutionary” ideal without the present material constraints).                               
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Post Scriptum: In the summer of 2004, the Cuban government started a campaign to 
eradicate corruption and illegalities from the business sector. As reported in the business 
press: “The new focus on corruption has been accompanied by measures to strip state 
businesses of their limited operational autonomy and to scrap executive perks such as 
expense accounts” (Frank, 2004, p.5). According to José Rámon Machado Ventura, a 
political bureau member, Cuba “was not only copying ‘capitalists’ management 
technique, but [also] its methods and style” (in Frank, 2004, p.5)             
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Table 1 
The dialectics of ideology at several levels: The emerging themes 
 Thesis Synthesis Antithesis 
Institutional 
environment 
The revolutionary 
society 
The regulated 
market  
Competitive markets
Professional culture 
of management 
Custodian of the 
revolution 
Socialist manager Managerial agency 
and intention  
Organizational 
culture 
The socialist 
enterprise 
The perfected 
socialist enterprise 
The capitalist 
enterprise    
Organizational 
behavior 
The vanguard 
worker 
The ideological 
bricoleur 
The competent 
manager  
 
    
